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Abstr act. Th ematic development of semiotics proves to be a transformative event for 
intellectual culture, manifesting itself to begin with in its reshaping of the usage of 
many philosophical terms in their refl ection of mainstream modern philosophy as 
its infl uence has sedimented down the level of ordinary language, i.e., today’s com-
mon speech. Central among these terms are subject and object as modern usage has 
established their sense, a sense which proves incompatible with the understanding of 
things that is emerging from the cenoscopic analysis of the being and action of signs. 
In particular also the term ‘relation’, surely among the most widely used and least an-
alysed terms of philosophy today, proves upon semiotic analysis to require a whole 
new understanding of the subjectivity/objectivity and object/thing distinctions as 
they have come to be more or less “settled” in modern usage. Th is essay explores the 
implications for such usage consequent upon the postmodern development of semi-
otics as the “doctrine” or “cenoscopic science” of signs.
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Modern philosophy began in the work of Descartes with a rejection of Latin 
Scholasticism, “lest in a too absorbed study of these works we should become in-
fected with their errors” (Descartes 1628: 6). No one among the moderns followed 
Descartes’ advice more completely than did Ludwig Wittgenstein (26 April 1889–
29 April 1951), as if to incarnate the diff erence between philosophy and scholarship. 
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His early work (1921, 1922) said one thing, his later work (c.1931−1950) quite an-
other (“let the dictionary be our guide to reality”, according to Hallett 1967: 165; and 
cf. 158 re semiotics); and it was the later work that centrally inspired the “linguistic 
turn” of late modern philosophy, the work in which Wittgenstein famously postu-
lated (PI, Par. 43) that “for a large class of cases – though not for all – … the meaning 
of a word is its use in the language”. 
Subsequent ‘analytic philosophy’ took up this theme with a vengeance, even to 
the point of forgetting the qualifi cation “not for all”. Subsequent developments in se-
miotics, however (Todorov 1977; Deely 2006, 2012a), revealed that the doctrine of 
signs undermined the very foundations of linguistic philosophy as the Analytic tra-
dition had come to conceive it. Analysis of semiosis shows decisively that “use in a 
language”, considered as a social system of habituated communication, is never the 
suffi  cient condition of meaning distinctive of anthroposemiosis, as it is perhaps in 
zoösemiosis (and hence within the zoösemiotic component of anthroposemiosis). 
1. Rediscovering a sense for some basic terms 
I have made the case many times1 that the medieval discovery of the sign’s triadic 
character, which Peirce – the fi rst of the postmoderns, by rejecting Descartes’ rejec-
tion of the past as philosophy’s laboratory − famously resumed from the late Latins 
(Beuchot, Deely 1995) in launching the contemporary development of semiotics (as 
we have seen it since the 1960s overtake and assimilate to itself the originally domi-
nant approach to signs from Saussure to Barthes called ‘semiology’), requires a kind 
of reversal of the terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ as they have come to be established 
in common usage today through the infl uence of the mainstream modern philo-
sophical development. For this mainstream modern development reduced ‘subjec-
tivity’ to psychological subjectivity, and ‘objectivity’ to the supposed state of “things 
as they are” apart from any ‘subjective infl uence’ (the a priori forms of Kantian ra-
tionality would not count as ‘subjective’ in the private sense, since they impart to the 
sensory manifold whatever it comes to have of universal and necessary features).
For semiotics, however, an object is not necessarily opposed to a subject, for 
nothing prevents what exists subjectively from coming to exist also objectively; and 
to exist as an object is nothing else than – is synonymous with – existing as some-
thing signifi ed, as something terminating a relation founded in (provenating from) 
some fi nite mind. To be signifi ed and to be an object are exactly the same thing. But 
this is a feature of reality that remains quite concealed in the common use of the 
1 For a full systematic treatment of the subject/object distinction now, see Deely 2009a, but 
also Deely 2009b, 2010a, 2011. 
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term ‘object’, which tends to equate (and hence to confuse) ‘objects’ with ‘things’ ex-
isting in the world,2 whether the ‘lifeworld’ (as modern idealisms understand the 
term) or the physical world (as modern realisms understand the term). 
1.1. The diff erence between objects and things 
Th ere is, however, this great diff erence between an object as such and a thing existing 
or able to exist apart from being known or desired: absent a relation to a fi nite know-
er, there is no object fully actual as object (in contrast to ‘thing’).3 No such constraint 
attaches to the notion of thing: a thing is what it is, irrespective of any awareness 
of it. Not so an object. Even when an object happens also to exist subjectively, as a 
thing, even then, if awareness of it ceases, so does it cease to be an object; and when 
there is an awareness of it, the ‘thing’ then becomes an object just to the extent that 
the awareness reaches, no further. Th is is because what constitutes any and every 
object as an object actually is that it provides the terminus for a relation which has 
its foundation in some psychological quality or “state” (cognitive or cathectic: see 
Deely 2015) that belongs to the subjectivity of the knower. 
But while the “founding quality” upon which the relation depends for its being 
exists as part of the knower’s subjectivity – part, that is to say, of that entire complex 
of characters which separate the knower as an individual from and within the rest of 
the universe – that is never and cannot be true of the relation itself. For the relation 
itself exists precisely suprasubjectively, as connecting the knower with, not separating 
the knower from, what is other than itself in its “isolated” or subjective being. If the 
“other than the knower” which is known – the object – exists in the physical sur-
roundings, then the relation of knowing terminates at an object which is also a thing, 
and can rightly be characterized as an intersubjective relation. Th is characterization, 
however, need not and is hardly ever (if ever) completely the case, for while an object 
2 E.g., Owens 1992: 75: “‘Th ing’ is meant to indicate in the widest possible way what an 
object is”. 
3 Let me try at this point to obviate a misunderstanding which a reader of this text might 
be inclined to fall into. When I say that there are no objects as such outside of apprehensive 
relations and that all objects as such are signifi cates, I am far from saying that only objects are 
signifi cates. Th ere is no question of psychologism here, in the pernicious sense which seeks 
to restrict semiosis to human awareness, or even to the broader biological realm of awareness 
in animal life. Objects in the full sense make their entry with apprehension, to be sure, but 
signifi cates are present and at play in nature long before fully actual objects in this strict and 
narrow sense that I am focusing upon here. Keep in mind that just as objects can also be things, 
so things can also be signifi cates before the advent of known things (“objects” in the fullest 
sense). I am grateful to my colleague and friend Vincent Colapietro for calling the pitfall of 
psychologism to my attention in the text as originally read at a 2006 Bari conference.
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of awareness (and aff ection) is always other than the subjective being of the knower, 
an object is far from always identical with something existing in the physical sur-
roundings independently of the knowing. 
1.2. The characteristic of objects to be communicable
Oft en the objects of which we are aware have no existence at all apart from the 
knowing itself, as when we say, falsely, that Hamlet can be well described as happy-
go-lucky; and oft en, even when the object to which we turn our consideration had 
an existence apart from the knowing, it does so no longer, as when we say controver-
sially that had Napoleon married the Polish Countess Marie Walewska instead of the 
Austrian Habsburg Archduchess Marie Louise there would have been no Waterloo. 
Th e characteristic of objects is not that they always exist in the physical environment 
but that they are always as objects public in principle, even when they exist for the 
awareness of but a single individual. Objects can be shared, as any two things can 
be related to a common third. Th us, when two people “understand one another”, the 
objective content of their understanding is a “common third”; and when one person 
seeks to acquaint another with some idea in mind, the deed is accomplished, if at 
all, not by some neural transplant of some feature of the subjective constitution of 
the fi rst person into the other. (Such a transplant would leave the fi rst quite blank on 
the matter at issue anyway!). Th e deed is accomplished, rather, by the object of the 
fi rst’s consideration being brought into the cognizance of the consideration of the 
second. For this, linguistic usage is oft en useful and sometimes essential, but never 
constitutive. 
To be communicated, as we well know, and as any teacher can well attest, the 
object communicated need by no means have a physical presence to the communi-
cants even when and if it has a physical presence elsewhere, for it need not have or 
have ever had a physical presence at all in the subjective sense of being an individual 
physically existing in order to be communicated as an object. 
2. The public character of objects in contrast with 
the subjectivity of things 
So how is it that every object, “real” or “unreal”, exists in a public condition in princi-
ple (which is the real meaning of ‘objectivity’ in contrast to ‘subjectivity’)? For while 
what is subjectively existing may come also to exist objectively, this is not required 
(any more – pace Kant – than it is precluded) by subjectivity as such. Th e reason is 
that an object necessarily, while a subjectively existing thing only contingently, exists 
as the terminus of cognitive and cathectic relations. Since an object can also exist 
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as more than the terminus of an apprehensive relation, but as such cannot be other 
than such a terminus, we have the reason why an object is always public in principle, 
even though the ideas and feelings on the basis of which objects are presented appre-
hensively are themselves part and parcel of our subjectivity as knowers, as cognitive 
organisms and animals in the environment. 
2.1. Signs, strictly and loosely in the common sense
Peirce and Poinsot, in exactly the same way, distinguished4 between signs in the 
strict sense, which are triadic relations, and signs in the common or loose sense, 
which are rather that one of the three elements united in the sign relation which oc-
cupies the foreground role of representing what is other than itself to the one for 
whom the sign is here and now functioning existentially. To the foreground element 
Peirce gave the technical name ‘representamen’,5 but Poinsot himself gave to it no 
special name, other than to make it unmistakably clear in the context of his usage 
that the sign in the loose or common sense is a sign-vehicle rather than a sign strictly, 
the sign strictly being, for Poinsot as for Peirce (though even more clearly in Poinsot’s 
treatment), as for semiotics today generally, a triadic relation in its suprasubjective 
character as a relation. 
2.2. Intersubjectivity as a special case of suprasubjectivity
Notice the diff erence between characterizing a relation as “intersubjective”, on the 
one hand, and as “suprasubjective”, on the other hand.6 Every relation as such exists 
over and above subjectivity, as what connects or links the individual subject in (or 
‘on’) which the relation is based to what is other than that individual in its private 
reality. Not every relation is apprehensive (cognitive or aff ective), but every relation 
which is intersubjective is so by linking two existing individuals or aspects thereof. 
Th e relation as a relation exists, in such circumstances, not in but between the two 
subjects. However, when only one of the two related has a physical existence here 
4 Poinsot and Peirce on signs in the strict sense or formally as relations vs. signs in the common 
or loose sense as representamens or foreground elements (sign-vehicles) under a semiosic relation: 
Poinsot 1632[1985]: Book I, Question 3, 154/20–39; Peirce 1904: CP 8.332. See further, under sign 
in the Index to Deely 2001: 993, the subentry “strict sense ...”. 
5  See Benedict 1985. Detailed listing of Peirce’s sign defi nitions and their relation to this notion 
of representamen is being developed from a presentation I gave at the 2014 July 16−19 “Charles 
S. Peirce International Centennial Congress Invigorating Philosophy for the 21st Century” at the 
Lowell, MA University of Massachusetts; but this is still a work-in-progress.
6 See Deely 2014, and Chapter 8 in Deely 2010b: “Re-evaluating the relative”; also Deely et al. 
2005: 223–242.
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and now (always true for the knower as knowing, obviously, and the real point of 
the “cogito ergo sum” formula – though missed by the author of the formula!), if the 
relation is not apprehensive, then not only cannot it be intersubjectively, but it can 
be only prospectively. Th e only relations that can actually obtain between an exis-
tent subject and a nonexistent object are cognitive and cathectic (or aff ective) rela-
tions, as we have noted. But when a relation obtains between a knower and an object 
that is either physically absent here and now, or simply nonexistent anywhere in the 
physical environment, while the object cognized or cathected exists indeed as ter-
minating suprasubjectively the apprehensive relation of the knower, that object has 
at the moment no further being, no subjectivity beyond its objectivity, no ‘subjective 
surplus’ to its being as object – at least, not any accessible to the one apprehending. 
3. How a philosophical doctrine of 
relation unlocks the puzzle 
Th e key to understanding this situation proper to objects lies in seeing precisely 
the connection with being a fundament or being a terminus, on the one hand, and, 
on the other hand, the being of the relation itself which is thus founded and thus 
terminating. 
Imagine fi rst a triangle, A, let us call it, existing physically all alone. Now imagine 
that alongside it though some distance away another triangle B comes into physi-
cal existence. A and B at that moment become similar on the basis of their shape, 
whether or not anyone apprehends them. 
Ockham and the mainstream moderns (Bertrand Russell, to his credit, was an 
exception in that lineage7) would say that this relation of similarity comes into ex-
istence only when some knower compares the two.8 Relations, on this view, have 
no awareness-independent status: all relations, regardless of circumstances, are 
awareness-dependent.
7 However, in appreciating the uniqueness of relations as a mode of being, Russell, so to 
say, over-appreciated it, and sometimes treated relations as things in the fundamental sense of 
individuals, thus glossing over the dependency in being of relation on a subjective characteristic 
of an individual for fundament, even as that characteristic in turn depends on the individual to 
the subjectivity of which it contributes: cf. the “diff erent but related senses” of the term ‘thing’ 
enumerated by Owens (1992: 74, 78) as (1) existing as an individual (strong sense), (2) existing 
in an individual (weak sense), vs. (3) existing as contextualizing an individual (weakest sense, 
what Aquinas termed [c.1245/6: Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 26 q. 2 a. 2 ad 2; see Aquinas 1980] “ens 
minimum”). 
8 Th e fi rst to demonstrate the unity of the mainstream moderns in reducing relations to 
awareness only was perhaps Weinberg 1965.
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Aristotle, Aquinas, Poinsot, and Peirce would say that the similarity is inter-
subjectively there in the environment, over and above the things which are similar, 
even though dependent upon those things in their subjective features as part of their 
distinct individuality, their subjectivity. Poinsot in particular would further clarify 
that, while any given relation can be awareness-independent only when it obtains 
between two physically existent subjects, that same relation can continue to exist 
awareness-dependently when one or both of the existent subjects has ceased to ex-
ist! Th is indiff erence of the positive being of relation as suprasubjective in every case 
to being or not being intersubjective as well, thus, is precisely what makes the action 
of signs possible in the fi rst place, because it is what makes relations singularly tran-
scendent to the distinction between what exists independently of and what exists de-
pendently upon the awareness of some fi nite mind.9
Th us, even when intersubjective, relations as such are even more basically supra-
subjective, because intersubjectivity is, as it were, but a subdetermination or “mo-
dalization” of suprasubjectivity which occurs sometimes, while suprasubjectivity is 
coterminus always with relation, whether the relation be awareness-dependent or 
awareness-independent – that is, purely objective or not necessarily objective at all. 
Whence even a relation which was one time real as obtaining in the physical envi-
ronment (like that between mother and son both alive, but which now continues 
only in memory, as the son was by an accident removed from the environment) was 
at fi rst intersubjective only (at the earliest stage of pregnancy) then became objective 
as well (once the pregnancy became known, and aft er birth), but is now (upon the 
child’s death) only objective. Yet in all these sets of circumstances the relation is su-
prasubjective, irreducible to the subjectivity of the mother grieving her son, her son 
still an object of awareness though no longer a subject of interaction. 
On such a view as this last, substantial to semiotics, as it has turned out (signs 
having been found to consist strictly speaking in relations as such, albeit triadic in 
character and not merely dyadic as relations can obtain in awareness-independent 
being), a relation of similarity in the case of simultaneous existents (simultaneous 
relata, as we might say) related by similarity (or whatever characteristic!) is an in-
tersubjective reality. Th e intersubjectivity in question obtains in the physical world 
as able to be apprehended but not necessarily actually apprehended (and never 
apprehended as such by perception, but only in the understanding,10 which is the 
9 In order to treat of signs, thus, “loquimur hic de relatione secundum esse [relation as supra-
subjective always], non de relatione praedicamentale [relation as intersubjective only], quia 
loquimur de signo in communi, prout includit tam signum naturale quam ad placitum, in quo 
involvitur etiam signum, quod est aliquid rationis [which has reality in awarenss only]”. – 
Poinsot 1632[1985]: 118/1−7.
10 Th e argument adumbrated in Deely 1982: 117, is spelled out in Deely 2000 and 2010a; but 
most specifi cally in Deely’s “Uninstantiability” (forthcoming). 
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fundamental reason why, as together with Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio I have 
explored at length, human beings alone among the lifeforms are semiotic animals11). 
When the similarity is apprehended, the relation exists objectively as well as in the 
physical order; but in the given case, even when it is not apprehended, the relation 
exists as part of the physical reality of the universe – as Emily, the daughter from 
the famous aff air between the Finnish theologian and the New York lawyer’s wife (of 
which aff air both Emily and the lawyer were ignorant, even as the Finnish theolo-
gian was ignorant of the existence of Emily, product of a drunken one-night stand of 
whose female participant the theologian never even learned the name), is objectively 
the daughter of the New York lawyer but physically and “really” (i.e., in the order of 
what is the case independently of awareness) the off spring of the Finnish theologian. 
3.1. The heart of the matter 
But here is the key point. Th e shape of A before B began was intrinsic to A as a sub-
jective characteristic, and remained subjectively the same when B came into exis-
tence; yet when B came into existence the shape of A, unchanged as subjective, also 
became the fundament of a relation of similarity to B: being a shape depends only 
11  Th at life depends upon semiosis is a generally accepted thesis in semiotics today. Th e 
animal umwelt in particular is product of the semiosis whereby, depending upon the animal’s 
bodily type, the physical environment becomes partially objectifi ed in awareness and then 
organized on the basis of the animal’s perception into the desirable (+), undesirable (–), and 
irrelevant (0). Th is partial reorganization within animal awareness of aspects of the physical 
environment to make for the animal a “meaningful world” of objects is the process on the 
side of Innenwelt called by Poinsot ‘phantasiari’, in contrast with the process of ‘sentire’ or 
basic animal awareness of the surroundings that arises directly from the interaction of the 
animal’s body with the surrounding bodies of the physical environment. Th us sentire provides 
the animal with the awareness of what it needs to organize according to fulfi llment of its 
specifi c needs for survival, while phantasiari provides the interpretation of that basic awareness 
which organizes the umwelt. In the case of human animals a further cognitive level intervenes, 
‘intelligere’, wherein relations in their diff erence from related objects and things can be directly 
objectifi ed; and it is this ability to consider objects that cannot be directly instantiated within 
the umwelt, the world of objects directly perceptible to sense, that Sebeok (1986) came to 
characterize in a 1984 lecture as “language in the root sense”, language as constitutive of the 
primary modelling system giving rise to linguistic communication as the secondary modelling 
system enabling the development of culture as the tertiary – not secondary – modelling system. 
For an overview of Sebeok’s argument on this point see Deely 2012b. Th e upshot is that while 
all animals are semiosic as dependent upon the action of signs, only human animals are semiotic 
as able to become aware of that action in its formal constitution through relations irreducibly 
triadic, yet alike with even dyadic relations in being uninstantiable to sentire and phantasiari in 
their contrast with intelligere. Among the alloanimals, thus, human animals diff er in kind. 
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upon subjectivity, but being a fundament presupposes a relation. And when B came 
into being, its subjective shape also became the terminus of a relation based on the 
shape of A as founding (as fundament for) the relation of similarity, which rela-
tion itself is to be found neither in A nor in B, but between A and B, i.e., over and 
above, suprasubjective respecting, both A and B; and conversely, when B came to be, 
its subjective shape also founded a relation of similarity terminating at the shape of 
A. Notice therefore: the being of a fundament as such and the being of a terminus as 
such, even though they both consist in the case before us in a subjective aspect of A 
and of B, owe their being as fundament and as terminus not to the subjectivity of A 
and B but to the suprasubjectivity, the actuality as such (also intersubjective in this 
case), of the relation itself. 
3.2. Consequences for the doctrine of signs 
Th e consequence for semiotics of the fundament and terminus both as such deriv-
ing something of their formal status from the relation itself, and only indirectly from 
any subjective dimension of being fundament or terminus may have in their own 
right, is profound. Medieval semiotics – the original fl orescence of semiotic con-
sciousness, launched by Augustine’s novel proposal of sign in general and culmi-
nating in Poinsot’s demonstration that the formal being of every sign is an irreduc-
ibly triadic relation as suprasubjective − made its fi rst advance by recognizing that 
not the subjectivity of a material structure made it be a sign (or ‘representamen’), 
but only the relation that material being exhibited to something other than itself in 
someone’s awareness. Whence it could be seen that psychological realities, ideas and 
feelings, similarly performed the essential sign-function of making present in aware-
ness something that, as other-representations, they themselves were not, namely, 
their objects. 
In recognizing that ideas and feelings – psychological states, cognitive (ideas) 
and cathectic (feelings) – could not exist save by giving rise to relations to objects, 
the moderns aft er Brentano saw in this the characteristic they called ‘intentional-
ity’, a characteristic which Brentano’s student, Edmund Husserl, made the basis for 
a new variant of mainstream modern philosophy, namely, phenomenology.12 Th is 
development was idealistic as Husserl himself came to conceive it,13 but in itself the 
recognition of the intentionality (the “of ” or “aboutness” of psychological states) is a 
realization both neutral and incompetent respecting the resolution of the root of the 
modern controversy between idealism and realism in philosophy.14 
12 Brentano 1874; Husserl 1900–1901; Deely 1978.
13 See esp. Husserl 1931; Spiegelberg 1965; Deely 1978, 2001: 581.
14 See Deely 2007.
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But the Latins in the line from Aquinas to Poinsot aft er Augustine had something 
the moderns characteristically lacked (by reason of the moderns’ following rather, in 
this particular, the views of William of Ockham, as Weinberg demonstrated), name-
ly, an understanding of the uniqueness of relation among the Aristotelian categories 
of mind-independent being stemming from the irreducibly suprasubjective charac-
ter of relation. So the Latins were able to discern in the phenomenon of intentional-
ity something much more profound, to wit, the identity of the objective as such with 
the terminus of a relation as such, and hence the public character of every object in 
principle whether that object also existed or not in the physical surroundings. Hence 
Poinsot in particular, addressing thematically the issue of sign-relations, found him-
self in a position to see as true for all relations, but decisive particularly for relations 
of semiosis, the fact that suprasubjectivity in every case, but intersubjectivity only in 
some cases, distinguishes the being of relations;15 and that objectivity as such – exist-
ing as signifi ed, let us say: existing in the being of a signifi cate as such, that linguistic 
label which the modern dictionary makers reveal their modern philosophical heri-
tage by resisting – depends in every case upon the unique being of relation among 
the other Aristotelian categories of the ways in which being can exist independently 
of human opinion, belief, and desire, each of which categories, with the sole excep-
tion of relation itself,16 either consists in subjectivity (the case of substance, quantity, 
quality, action, and passion) or presupposes relation (the case of where, when, pos-
ture, and vestition or ‘habitus’).17
4. Objects are signifi cates 
Th e word ‘signifi cate’ may be resisted by makers of modern English dictionaries, but 
it is inevitable once the doctrine of signs reaches a more public maturity. For sig-
nifi cate is the proper name for what heretofore confusedly has been generally called 
‘object’. Psychological states diff er from physiological and inorganic physical states 
in that the latter two only contingently, but the former necessarily, give rise to rela-
tions as suprasubjective structures of being. While a quantity or physical quality can 
give rise to a relation under one set of circumstances and lose that relation under 
another set, a psychological state cannot be without giving rise to a relation. Th us a 
psychological state – cognitive or cathectic – never occurs merely subjectively, but 
always also fundamentally (as a foundation or fundament) respecting an actual rela-
tion. And just as this relation itself is what imparts to the subjective idea or feeling its 
15 Cf. Poinsot’s Tractatus de Signis 1632[1985]: Book I, Question 1, esp. 118/1–18, in light of 
the Second Preamble, Article 1, 93/17–96/36.
16  See the diagram of the full Aristotelian scheme of categories in Deely 2001: 77.
17  Detailed analysis of Aristotle’s categories in terms of this point, the singularity of relation, 
can be found in Deely 2001: 72–78; Deely 2010a.
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character as fundament, so necessarily does this same relation impart the status of 
terminus to something objectively other than the subjectivity of the knower, wheth-
er that objectivity has also a subjectivity of its own or not (i.e., whether the relation 
is intersubjective as well as suprasubjective or only suprasubjective). Th is last is the 
case of pure objectivity, of a signifi cate which has no being outside the sign relation 
for which it provides the objective term, contrasting with its representamen and its 
interpretant alike (as the other two terms essential) in formation of the semiotic tri-
ad in which signifi cation as a full actuality always consists in unifying via relation.
4.1. Passions of the soul as grounds of objectivity
Just as it is not the eyes that see but the animal who sees by means of the eyes, so it 
is not a mental representation which perceives or understands but the animal who 
perceives or (if it be a semiotic animal) understands. Now what are these mental 
representations by means of which the animal apprehends objects? In contrast to 
the objects which, as objects, are self-representations, the subjective but psychologi-
cal states are other-representations. Th ey are, according to late Latin tradition, for-
mal signs, but this designation remained ambiguous as between Ockham, say, and 
Poinsot, and has not fared well since – largely because representations as “formal 
signs” belong to that large class of signs loosely so called or “representamens”, rather 
than to the class of signs strictly speaking, that is to say, triadic relations enabling all 
apprehension of objects, whether partly “real” or purely objective. 
In this case older turns out to be better, and although the introduction of the dis-
tinction between instrumental and formal signs (around the 14th or 15th centuries), 
as between sign vehicles which are material substances and sign vehicles which are 
rather psychological states, did serve to advance the development of the original se-
miotic consciousness, the original designation of these representative states subjec-
tive to the knower as passiones animae, “passions of the soul”, may serve us better 
than the later signa formalia designation. Indeed, this earlier designation goes back 
among the Latins to at least AD 511-13 (Boethius), and, unlike the notion signum or 
“sign in general”, which eff ectively originated with Augustine AD 397,18 truly traces 
back to Aristotle (c. 330 BC), and the later substitution or imposition upon this no-
tion of the designation “signa formalia” was in essence but the attempt to bring this 
notion of the “passions of the soul” under the umbrella of the doctrine of signs.
Modern philosophy cut all this off . Not only, beginning especially (but not ex-
clusively) with Descartes did modern philosophy turn from the Way of Signs to the 
18 A surprising fact, and one of the most interesting though but recently recognized facts 
of philosophy’s ancient and medieval history. For the Greek period of philosophy before 
Augustine, see esp. Manetti 1987, 1993, 2013; Eco et al.1984 and 1986. On the development 
aft er Augustine up to the 17th century, see Deely 2009c. 
18 John Deely
Way of Ideas, but it did so without the principal modern founders even realizing that 
the Way of Signs had been opened up. Such ignorance was not the case with the no-
tion or doctrine of the passions of the soul. Yet this notion as intrinsically oriented to 
the Way of Signs, this notion as it had come to be interpreted among the late Latins, 
was simply “passed over without comment” by Descartes, through his ignorance of 
its implications as developed in the 15th–16th century discussion of signa formalia. 
Familiar at least with the earlier medieval notion of passiones animarum, as also, 
presumably, of its Aristotelian origins, Descartes said in Article 1 of Th e Passions of 
the Soul:
…what the Ancients have taught concerning the passions of the soul, is so little, 
and for the most part so little credible that I cannot hope to draw nigh truth, but 
by keeping aloof off  from those roads which they followed. Wherefore I shall here 
be forced to write in such a sort, as if I treated of a matter never before handled.19
And he proceeded to handle the passions of the soul in his thoroughly subjectivistic 
way whereby the mind was cut off  within itself from its surrounding environment, as 
has been eff ectively summarized in the metaphor of the “problema pontis”, or “prob-
lem of fi nding a bridge” between the external world of things and the internal world 
of mental representations, “ideas” construed as self-representations.
4.2. Passions of the soul as inseparable from relations 
Now in this regard the ancient discussion of relative being turns out to be crucial. 
Everyone agreed that there are in the world individuals, subjects of existence, and 
that these individuals perforce have distinguishing characteristics or “accidents”, as 
Aristotle termed them. But Aristotle, Aquinas, and Poinsot, in an unbroken tradi-
tion picked up again by Charles Sanders Peirce, considered that subjects of existence 
with their subjective characteristics were not the whole of reality, ens reale (aware-
ness-independent being, the being of the physical universe as such): for in that very 
awareness-independent order there also obtained, as we saw above – resultant from 
but not reducible to the subjectivities interacting – relations as such not subjective 
(though dependent upon the subjective) but intersubjective. Aquinas suggested this 
19 Descartes’ Les passions de l’ame was fi rst published in French simultaneously by Henry Le 
Gras in Paris and Louys Elzevier in Amsterdam in 1649; an anonymous English translation 
appeared in London in 1650 (printed for A.C. and sold by J. Martin and J. Ridley) as Th e 
Passions of the Soul. Th e quotation from the latter was retrieved from http://beta.cgu.edu/
philosophy/descartes/Passions_Letters.html. Th ere is also a contemporary English translation 
by Stephen H. Voss (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989). 
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point, for example, in his Summa theologiae (1266[1980]: 1.28c), but Poinsot fi rst 
thematically seized upon the point that intersubjectivity was not the whole story of 
purely relative being, but only the beginning of the story in ens reale. For once ani-
mals had entered upon the scene of the physical environment, with them came rela-
tions that were awareness-dependent alongside the awareness-independent relations 
belonging to the “category” of relation in Aristotle’s sense of category: a classifi cation 
of a way that being can exist independently of thought, action, or belief.
4.3. Objects for animals 
Animals, in order to orientate themselves in their environment, have to add to the 
physically related things of the environment relations which specifi cally further re-
late those things to themselves as objects, for example, in order to track prey, avoid 
becoming prey, or even simply to “fi nd their way home”. Animals do not simply live 
in a physical environment, they live in an objective world of interpreted things – an 
umwelt, as Jakob von Uexküll called it for animals in general; a ‘lifeworld’, as Husserl 
would come to say for the case of humans. Th us Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944) was 
the fi rst thinker thematically to analyse this situation of the diff erence between the 
physical environment in itself and that part of the same environment as “lived in” 
and assign a name to the latter. And ‘umwelt’ was the name he gave to that objective 
world of the animal as it includes something of, yet diff ers from, the mere physical 
surroundings. 
In Poinsot’s tradition, the only thinker to pick up on this fundamental concept, 
traces of which infl uenced Heidegger as well, was Josef Pieper (1952; see Deely 
2004). But the semiotic roots, so to speak, of the “objective world”, the umwelt, are 
fi rst traced in the remarkable “First Preamble. Article 3” of John Poinsot’s Tractatus 
de Signis of 1632 (esp. 66/47–68/34; see Poinsot 1985), where he demonstrates that 
purely objective relations, known in his time as entia rationis, despite their mislead-
ing name as “belonging to reason”, are formed unwittingly but essentially and neces-
sarily by ‘alloanimals’20 (‘brute animals’, in medieval designation for animals able to 
perceive but not to grasp relations in their diff erence from related things, and hence 
not able to use linguistic communication as such in the species-specifi cally human 
sense) no less than by so-called ‘rational animals’, or what we have come to call ‘se-
miotic animals’, namely, ourselves.
20  ‘Alloanimals’ is a term called to my attention by Myrdene Anderson as used in the work 
of Count 1973 (and others) to mean all the animals besides the human animals. Th is of course 
is exactly the sense of the Latin ‘brute animals’ (animalia bruta), but jettisons the unhelpful 
pejorative connotations that attach to the adjective ‘brute’ in modern linguistic usage.
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Th is demonstration proves a fundamental breakthrough for our understanding 
of signs, and for our understanding of the extent of semiosis.21 It provides nothing 
less than the fi rst theoretical outlining of what we have come today to call, adopt-
ing the apt designation provided by the tireless work in this area of our late friend 
Th omas Sebeok, “zoösemiotics” (e.g. Sebeok 1963). For objects exist fully and for-
mally as such only as terminating suprasubjective relations of apprehension, as we 
have seen; whence the presence of such relations in the life of all animals already 
guarantees Todorov’s point that “[as] long as one questions oneself only on verbal 
language, one remains within a science (or a philosophy) of language” (Todorov 
1977: 40); but once one begins to entertain the notion of semiotics as the doctrine 
of signs, among the fi rst questions to be faced is “the place of linguistic signs among 
signs in general” (Todorov 1977: 40). For once words have been conceived at the 
level of signs “they occupy only one place among others”, whence the independent 
status of “linguistic analysis”, be it scientifi cally or philosophically conceived, is ir-
remediably compromised. No longer is language the safe haven philosophers have 
sought since the 1970s in making what they have called ‘the linguistic turn’ (see 
Rorty 1972), for we see that semiotics has done to late modern philosophy’s Citadel 
of Language what the storm Katrina did to New Orleans in the summer of 2005.
4.4. Why objects need not be real to be known 
Now awareness-dependent (or purely objective) relations are no more subjective 
than are awareness-independent or so-called (by contrast) “real” (“mind-indepen-
dent”) relations. Moreover, the entire being of all relations, of any relation, is to re-
late an existing subject to something other than itself, something which it itself is 
not: some other thing, in the case of categorial or real relations in the order of physi-
cal being; some other object in the case of apprehensive relations, and – here again is 
the key, of which Poinsot was the fi rst thematically to take notice – nothing in the su-
prasubjective being of relation itself determines whether it will be intersubjective or not, 
21 Here I am concerned only with the fi rst step in which semiotics went beyond the semiology 
from Saussure to Barthes: the demonstration of a semiosis beyond linguistically based 
anthroposemiosis in the broader biological world of animals other than human. Th e further 
steps semiotics made, rapidly aft er 1963, in demonstrating also a semiosis among plants 
(phytosemiosis), leading to the umbrella conception of biosemiosis extending to plants and 
animals along with humans, and then (I fi rst introduced the concept and term ‘physiosemiosis’ 
in my talk “Th e Grand Vision”, presented at the Charles Sanders Peirce Sesquicentennial 
International Congress held at Harvard University 5–10 September 1989; see Deely 1994: 183–
200 for the published version) to the controversial argument that even in organic nature prior 
to and independent of life the action of signs was at work, I am far from denying but simply not 
treating directly in the present essay.
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but only the circumstances under which the relation is formed here and now. Th us, 
I can say “It is raining now”, and my hearers (if they be English speakers) will have 
brought before their minds exactly the same objective reality when it is actually rain-
ing and when it is not actually raining. In the former case, the relation will be real as 
well as objective, like the relation between Emily and the Finnish theologian from 
our point of view (in contrast with the point of view of the New York lawyer, and in 
contrast with the point of view of the Finnish theologian himself – as we alone know 
the full story!); while in the latter case, the relation will be no less objective yet it 
will not be real. Th e relation is unchanged. Th e terminus of the relation, the objective 
reality, is unchanged. Only the subjective surrounding circumstances are changed, 
and yet these are enough to make the relation in one case “real” (awareness-indepen-
dent), in the other case “unreal” (purely objective), and the terminus of the relation 
in one case more than a terminus merely (a subjective dimension having been added 
to its objectivity), while in the other case merely a terminus (which is all that objec-
tivity as such, and in order to be public in principle, requires).
4.5. How ideas and feelings diff er from objects 
Ideas and feelings are not awareness-dependent beings in the Aristotelian categorial 
sense, even though they require minds in order to be, for it is not the awareness of 
them that makes them be, but rather their being that shapes and forms awareness. 
As such, they are qualities in the Aristotelian categorial scheme, and so subjective. 
But what distinguishes them as subjective is that they are never merely and wholly 
that, but also always fundaments supporting relations, even when the circumstances 
required for these relations to be intersubjective are not fulfi lled. Whence, since, as 
we have seen, it is the actuality of the relation itself which makes a given subjective 
quality to be a fundament and that maintains a terminus opposed to (correlative 
with but “other than”) the fundament, the objects of such relations constitute a su-
prasubjective world not only to the extent that their termini incorporate something 
of the physical surroundings (which they always do insofar as sensation prescissively 
considered is involved) but equally to the extent that their objective content is not 
verifi ed or perhaps even verifi able as such in the physical universe as “real”, i.e., sub-
jectively existing, whether prior or subsequent to and independent of awareness. 
Again, this fundamental insight found nascent expression in the Latin line which 
culminated in Poinsot’s Tractatus de Signis as the fi rst systematic demonstration of 
the being of all signs as unifi ed in the reality of irreducibly triadic relations. Poinsot 
(1632[1985]: Book II, Question 5, 270/37–271/9) brings to our attention this dis-
tinction between objects and things semiotically understood when he incorporates 
Cajetan’s insight (1507) into the doctrine of signs itself:
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... the conclusion hangs from that distinguished doctrine in Cajetan’s Com-
mentary on the Summa theologiae, I, q. 1, art. 3, that the diff erences of things 
as things are quite other than the diff erences of things as objects and in the 
being of an object; and things that diff er in kind or more than in kind in the 
one line, can diff er in the other line not at all or not in the same way. And so, 
seeing that the rationale of a sign pertains to the rationale of the knowable 
[the line of thing as object], because it substitutes for the object, it will well 
be the case that in the rationale of object an awareness-independent natural 
sign and a stipulated awareness-dependent sign are univocal signs [are signs 
in a shared sense]; just as an awareness-independent being and an awareness-
dependent being assume one rationale in their being as object, since indeed 
they terminate the same [cognitive] power ... and can be attained by the same 
habit .... Th erefore in the being of an object specifying, stipulated and natural 
signs coincide univocally.
We see then that the “passions of the soul”, what we would call today “psychological 
states”, have a decisive role in semiosis. Th ey are within us the subjective ground of 
our objective world, even as our physical surroundings are the subjective ground of 
intersubjective relations some of which are objectively incorporated into our objec-
tive world as sign relations, the sign relations upon which science and philosophy 
depend in their diff erence from fi ction. Yet fi ction, too, depends upon these sign 
relations in order to achieve its credibility, as Umberto Eco (1976: 7) summarized in 
his famous maxim: semiotics studies “everything which can be used in order to lie”.
But these “passions of the soul”, subjectively present as part of that which sepa-
rates and constitutes us each as distinct individuals, unlike the shape of our nose or 
the colour of our skin, do not provenate22 or give rise to relations only contingently 
22 Th is term from the Latin Age has not yet made its way into English dictionaries. Th e 
English verb-form ‘provenate’ is a neologism introduced into semiotics from the 1632[1985] 
Latin Treatise on Signs of John Poinsot. Th is verb as an English form derives from the Latin 
infi nitive ‘provenire’, to come or issue forth, appear, arise, be produced; its closest relative in 
modern English is the noun-form ‘provenance’ (“where something originated or was nurtured 
in its early existence”). Hence, a relation provenates from its fundament only contingently 
in ens reale (i.e., in the order of being as existing independently of awareness) restrictively 
conceived, but necessarily when the fundament is a psychological state (cognitive or cathectic) 
of an animal. Th us, as psychological states cannot be without being ‘of ’ or ‘about’ something 
other than themselves, so as qualities they belong to subjectivity indeed, but specifi cally as 
that subjectivity is entangled inescapably with suprasubjectivity; and the relations consequent 
upon such qualities do not depend upon a subjectively existing terminus in order to arise as 
relations. In this case, the relation provenates – i.e., issues forth from or ‘on the foundation of ’ 
the psychological quality – necessarily, regardless of any subjectivity on the side of its terminus. 
For just as terminus as terminus and fundament as fundament equally depend upon the 
suprasubjective being of relation alike when the terminus also has a subjective dimension and 
when it does not have such a dimension, so when a quality which (besides being subjectively 
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or dyadically, but necessarily and triadically. Whence these relations also unite or 
connect us to one another, and in general to everything that we are not in apprehen-
sion — not only to other persons and physical realities, but to purely objective and 
“ideal” realities as well, some of which, no doubt, in the course of time, will become 
“real” in their own turn, while others will never and some could never exist beyond 
objectivity.
5. In conclusion
Th ings exist in themselves. But objects, even when they are also things, and whet-
her or not they are also things, only exist as signifi eds, the signifi cates of semiosis. 
Th e term ‘object’ has been around for centuries. Indeed, in the Latin Age, though 
the thing/object distinction was never fully thematized, it was well on its way to a 
full thematization, as we fi nd most notably in the opening pages of Poinsot’s 1632 
Treatise on Signs23 where he distinguishes objects as self-representations from 
inherent) is a fundament necessarily and not just contingently gives rise to an actual relation, 
that relation in turn, while making the fundament a fundament (as formally distinct even 
though materially identical with the subjective state as inherent accident founding the relation), 
cannot be except as also making a terminus, even though that terminus is only contingently 
and not necessarily or even not at all further given subjectively as an instantiation in its own 
right of the subjective dimension of ens reale. Relations which arise contingently, the only kind 
considered in Aristotle’s circumscription of relation as an irreducible categorial mode of το 
ὀν, in other words, do necessarily have a terminus which is also a subjective accident; but the 
necessity in the case directly bears only on the question of the relation’s intersubjectivity, not on 
its presupposed and more basic suprasubjectivity, without which latter “feature” it could not 
be a relation at all, but with which it may, or may not, depending solely upon circumstances, 
be intersubjective as well as suprasubjective. Th is is the “singularity” of relation which makes 
semiosis, the action of signs, possible in the fi rst place, because it is the ground of the prior 
possibility of the modality of being which has semiosis as its consequent, and which also 
provides (in anthroposemiosis) the ground of the prior possibility of that conformity between 
‘thought’ and ‘thing’ in which truth consists (not to mention the alternative generic possibility 
of deception and specifi cally anthroposemiosic possibility of a lie). Th us the term ‘provenate’ 
has been introduced as an English verb precisely in order to clarify the theoretical ground upon 
which signs depend as a distinct subject of inquiry among the phenomena of nature and culture. 
Cf. Deely 2010b: xiii–xiv.
23 Poinsot 1632[1985]: Book I, Question 1, 116/14–117/19: “In nostra ergo defi nitione ad 
rationem signi in communi duo concurrunt: Primum est ratio manifestativi seu repraesentativi. 
Secoundum ordo ad alterum, scilicet ad rem, quae repraesentatur, quae debet esse divrsa a signo, 
nihil enim est signum sui nec signifi cat se, et ad potentiam, cui manifestat et repraesentat rem a se 
distinctam. 
 Et quidem manifestativum ut sic constat non dicere relationem, tum quia potest salvari in 
ordine ad se et sine respectu ad alterum, ut ... quando obiectum repraesentat se, ut videatur, etc. 
....
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signs as other-representations, and both from things as existing independently of 
awareness. 
But the modern national languages, as far as concerns philosophy, developed 
their “common usage” not along the Latin line but rather along the line entailed by 
Descartes’ “turn to the subject”, collapsing objects into ideas as subjective psycho-
logical states, and combining this move24 with Ockham’s view that relations have no 
formal reality save within awareness, completing the break of modern thinkers with 
Latin Scholasticism precipitated most notably by the condemnation of Galileo. 
Th us, while the object/thing distinction developed in the protosemiotic period 
between Augustine (†430AD) and Poinsot (†1644) in the line of explaining how 
things in themselves are knowable though far from the whole of objectivity, modern 
thought up to Charles Peirce (†1914) placed the two terms in an opposition defi ned 
as the two opposing sides of the “problema pontis” with no way across.
Semiotics aft er Peirce turns out to have moved swift ly in the direction of restor-
ing the earlier development, most notably in compelling a realization that the mod-
ern usage of the term ‘object’ has from the fi rst obscured the essential dependency of 
objectivity upon semiosis. Once we have come to realize, however, that to say ‘object’ 
is to say obscurely what ‘object signifi ed’ says plainly, and further that the ‘signifi ed’ 
in the expression ‘object signifi ed’ is actually redundant (since there is no other kind 
of object, at least not fully actualized as object, not “as such”), we see that even the 
term ‘object’ itself, though unlikely to go away or soon fi nd itself in desuetude, is yet 
somewhat otiose. 
For ‘object’ mainly says obscurely (and in ways that, over the modern centuries 
at least, have all but universally led to confusions all around concerning questions of 
noetic) what the term ‘signifi cate’ – a term deemed “obsolete and rare” by the OED, 
beginning, indeed, around the time that modernity in philosophy turned its back 
on the Way of Signs to explore instead that cul-de-sac termed by Leibniz “the Way 
of Ideas”, the modern way in philosophy – says clearly and with far less likelihood of 
confusion. At least, this is how it seems to me now that semiotics as the doctrine of 
signs is coming into its own. 
 At vero manifestativum signi invenitur et cum ordine ad alterum, quia nihil seipsum signifi cat, 
licet se repraesentare possit, et cum dependentia, quia signum semper est minus signifi cato et ab 
ipso ut a mensura dependens.” 
 Th is systematic contrast between representation generically and signifi cation as species 
thereof (between the manifestative and the signifi cative aspects of a sign) runs throughout 
Poinsot’s Treatise, and is perhaps most fully explained at 122/17–123/25 and 132/16–46. 
24 A move in which, in both respects, John Locke diff ered not a whit from Descartes, the two 
together laying the groundwork for Kant’s “critical synthesis” of modern philosophy as having 
rendered the world of things-in-themselves unknowable: see the summation in Deely 2013.
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It is an example of Hoff meyer’s (2008: 939) “vis a prospecto”, semiosis as an “in-
fl uence of the future” — in this case an “infl uence of the future” bound to eff ect a 
change of usage, if Ramírez’ projection of 2010 proves true:
Most readers of Deely’s Four Ages volume encounter diffi  culty with his use 
of the terms “subject” and “object”, which are the key to the book. ... Th e 
shift s in signifi cation Deely’s work eff ects [...] awaken us to the fact that [...] 
every object – given Poinsot’s demonstrations regarding the data of external 
sense, where human awareness (like that of any animal) begins – is something 
signifi ed [...] that is to say, something depending for its existence, not as a thing 
(when it is also a thing, indeed), but as an object specifi cally and precisely 
upon the action of signs. [...] [I] suggest that Deely’s new technical usage may 
actually become a postmodern common usage. (Ramirez 2010: 47, 79)
For when the universities fi nally succeed to fi gure out the place semiotics by right 
occupies within intellectual culture – to wit, as the only inherently transdisciplinary 
perspective25 – this “change in common usage” projected by Ramirez seems to me 
inevitable. Objectivity is simply reality – synechistically conceived in Peirce’s sense,26 
i.e., the whole of reality, not just the physical dimension or parts – in relation to fi nite 
mind.
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Семиозис и «значение как употребление»: необходимость и 
недостаточность субъективности при знаковом воздействии
Тематическое развитие семиотики оказывается транформативным событием 
для интеллектуальной культуры, проявляясь в переосмыслении употребле-
ния многих философских терминов, опустившихся до уровня «обыденного 
языка». Среди таких терминов центральными являются «субъект» и «объект». 
Их употребление несовместимо с пониманием, которое выросло из ценоско-
пического анализа существования и функционирования знаков. Оказывается, 
что термин «соотношение», который несомненно относится к одним из самых 
распространенных и менее всего проанализированных терминов в современ-
ной философии, при его семиотическом анализе нуждается в новом понима-
нии различения субъективности/объективности и объекта и вещи. В настоя-
щей статье изучаются импликации подобного различения, которое основано 
на постмодернистском развитии семиотики как «учения о знаках» или «цено-
скопической науки о знаках».
Semioos ja “tähendus kui kasutus”: subjektiivsuse möödapääsmatus ja 
ebapiisavus märkide toimimises
Semiootika temaatiline areng osutub intellektuaalse kultuuri jaoks transformatiiv-
seks sündmuseks, mis ilmneb paljude fi losoofi liste terminite kasutusviisi ümber ku-
jundamisel, võtte arvesse seda, kuidas need peegeldavad moodsa fi losoofi a pea voolu, 
kui selle mõju on settinud “tavakeele” tasemele. Nende terminite seas on kesksed 
‘subjekt’ ja ‘objekt’ nii, nagu moodsas kasutuses on kehtestunud nende tähendus, mis 
osutub kokkusobimatuks arusaamaga asjadest, mis võrsub märkide olemise ja toi-
mimise tsönoskoopilisest analüüsist. Ilmneb, et eriti termin ‘suhe’, mis kahtlemata 
kuulub tänapäeva fi losoofi as kõige laiemalt kasutatavate ja kõige vähem analüüsitud 
terminite hulka, osutub semiootilise analüüsi puhul vajavat tervet uut arusaama sub-
jektiivsuse/objektiivsuse ja objekti/asja eristustest. Käesolev essee uurib sellise kasu-
tuse implikatsioone, mis tulenevad semiootika kui ‘märgiõpetuse’ või ‘tsönoskoopili-
se märgiteaduse’ postmodernsest arengust.
